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Schiller on the Pleasure of Tragedy
Samuel Hughes
In this paper I offer a reconstruction and defence of a neglected theory of the pleasure we take in 
tragedy, that of Friedrich Schiller. Schiller held that our pleasure in tragedy is an instance of our 
pleasure in the sublime, which in turn he characterized as a revelation of human freedom through 
suffering. I show how many of the pretheoretically important characteristics of tragedy can be 
understood as making tragedy sublime in this sense, and that, accordingly, it is plausible that we do 
indeed take Schiller’s pleasure in it. I go on to argue that this sensitivity to what is important about 
tragedy constitutes an important advantage of Schiller’s account vis-à-vis its more famous successors 
in the post-Kantian tradition, those of Schopenhauer and Hegel.
It has long been thought that there is something perplexing about why we take pleasure 
in tragedy and many philosophers have developed accounts of this pleasure in response. In 
this paper I shall present and defend one such account, that of Friedrich Schiller. Schiller 
is himself widely celebrated as a tragedian, but his philosophical work on tragedy has 
received very little attention in Anglophone aesthetics.1 It is the contention of this paper 
that this neglect is unjustified and that it is possible to reconstruct from Schiller’s essays a 
powerful and plausible account of our response to tragedy.
The structure of my discussion is simple enough. In Section 1, I examine what precisely 
the question is that Schiller, and other philosophers, were asking about tragic pleasure, 
and how potential answers to that question might be assessed. In Section 2, I  outline 
Schiller’s account, and in Section 3 I argue for its plausibility. I conclude in Section 4 by 
discussing implications of this plausibility, and in particular whether the account’s plau-
sibility is sufficient to justify its acceptance as the correct interpretation of our pleasure 
in tragedy.
1 The most important exception is Frederick Beiser’s excellent exegetical discussion in Schiller as Philosopher: 
A Re-Examination (Oxford: OUP, 2005), esp. 238–262; Beiser, however, largely prescinds from philosophical 
defence or critique. The same may be said for Ronald Duncan Miller’s older study, Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom 
(Oxford: OUP, 1970 [1959]). Sebastian Gardner, on the other hand, develops a searching philosophical critique 
of Schiller’s account in his ‘Tragedy, Morality and Metaphysics’, in Sebastian Gardner and José Luis Bermúdez 
(eds.) Art and Morality (Oxford: Routledge, 2003), 230–236 and 249–50, but focuses on a moralized version of 
Schiller’s theory, on which freedom is revealed only in obedience to the moral law. Schiller certainly does take 
this view in some of his essays, and I am sympathetic to Gardner’s criticisms of it. But, as Gardner of course 
acknowledges (ibid., 249), Schiller elsewhere expounds a more plausible non-moralized account, against which 
Gardner’s objections are not directed: it is this account which I am concerned to defend here. Elsewhere, 
Schiller’s theory of tragedy has been largely ignored in Anglophone aesthetics. Julian Young’s The Philosophy 
of Tragedy: From Plato to Zizek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) has no sustained treatment; 
Paul Guyer briefly discusses Schiller’s account of the sublime in his A History of Modern Aesthetics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), II: 475–457, but without extended comment; Walter Kaufmann’s 
distinguished Tragedy and Philosophy (New York: Anchor Books, 1969) does not mention Schiller’s theory at all.
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2 | SAMUEL HUGHES
It is perhaps appropriate to note before proceeding that Schiller’s views on tragedy were 
expounded in a number of essays written over a period of years and exhibit considerable 
development over that time.2 My purpose being principally philosophical, I shall not hesi-
tate to discount minor inconsistencies in Schiller’s discussions or to select the strongest of 
a number of different positions between which he wavered. The development of Schiller’s 
views is of great historical significance and interest, but, as I hope to show, his ideas also 
have sufficient philosophical worth to merit a philosophically-oriented reconstruction.
I
Schiller’s claim is that our pleasure in tragedy is an instance of our pleasure in the sublime, 
which in turn he understands to be the revelation of human freedom through suffering. In 
the next section, I will explain this claim in detail, but it is worth considering first what 
the explanatory aim of Schiller’s, and similar, accounts is. I take this to be simple: Schiller 
seeks to give an explanation of our mysterious pleasure in tragedy by interpreting it as an 
instance of a kind of pleasure. Such explanations are really very common and mundane:
A: Why do you enjoy visiting churches so much, despite being a nonbeliever?
B: Oh, because I find them architecturally interesting.
If B’s response here is acceptable, then it has a very straightforward explanatory value: it 
constitutes the assimilation of a mysterious pleasure (‘B’s pleasure in visiting churches’) to 
a non-mysterious kind of pleasure (‘pleasure in interesting architecture’). But of course, 
it might be disputed:
A: Really? I  hadn’t thought you were interested in architecture. And besides, you 
even like visiting dull churches. Are you sure it isn’t because they remind you of your 
childhood?
The account is disputed on the grounds that certain facts related to B’s actual pleasure are 
inconsistent with its being an instance of the kind of pleasure suggested—specifically, a 
fact about the subject of the pleasure (B’s lack of interest in architecture) and a fact about 
its object (that it includes architecturally undistinguished churches). The discussion might 
continue indefinitely, with further interpretations being offered, and their plausibility 
being determined against such criteria. Observations about the physiological symptoms 
of B’s pleasure, its phenomenology and so on might also be useful. Perhaps they will ulti-
mately decide that B takes a number of different sorts of pleasure in visiting churches.3
It will be apparent that much of the canonical discussion of tragedy can be understood 
on this template. We know that we have some sort of pleasure in tragedies, but we are 
not sure just what sort of pleasure this is. Catharsis, sublime renunciation, intellectual 
synthesis and so on are then offered as characterizations or interpretations of this pecu-
liar experience. The usual run of criteria will be in use for deciding which account is the 
most attractive one. One may appeal to facts about the subject: someone might reject the 
claim made in Lucretius’s name that our pleasure is really the enjoyment of one’s relative 
2 For an excellent discussion, see Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 238–262.
3 I take these remarks to be largely ecumenical between differing contemporary accounts of pleasure, none of 
which in particular do I mean to presuppose.
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security in comparison to the protagonists’ plight on the hopeful grounds that ‘I’m not the 
sort of person who takes such vicious pleasures’.4 Phenomenological or physiological data 
might be appealed to. Very often, appeal is made to facts about the object. For instance, 
one may object to the 18th century theories on which tragic pleasure is a kind of admira-
tion of the heroes’ moral virtues on the ground that a number of paradigmatic tragedies 
feature very wicked heroes and accordingly cannot be the objects of this kind of pleasure.5
It is important to distinguish this issue clearly from two neighbouring discussions with 
which it has sometimes been elided under headings like ‘the paradox of tragedy’. Firstly, 
it is distinct from the question of what our motivation is in reading and watching trag-
edies.6 Achieving a successful characterization of the pleasure taken in tragedy need not 
entail that pursuit thereof is our motive in watching tragedies; nor need the settlement 
of the motivation question entail anything about which interpretation of tragic pleasure 
is the correct one. The question of motivation, though perhaps related, is thus indepen-
dent. Secondly, it is not an instance of the question of why we sometimes ‘enjoy negative 
emotions’.7 In fact, this might not even be relevant to an enquiry into tragic pleasure. It 
is possible that the pleasure taken in tragedy is in fact a ‘negative emotion’ that we some-
how enjoy. If that were found to be the most plausible interpretation of tragic pleasure, 
then to fully understand that experience we should clearly have to establish how negative 
emotions can be enjoyable. But as we shall see, this was not Schiller’s interpretation of 
tragic pleasure; nor, to my knowledge, was it the view of any other canonical writer on 
tragedy. Rather, philosophers have tended to suppose the pleasure in tragedy to be in itself 
an uncontroversially positive experience which is, however, in some way related to more 
pained feelings: catharsis, moral admiration, presentiment of spiritual resolution and the 
dynamical sublime may all be adduced as examples. How we enjoy negative emotions is 
thus pertinent to an enquiry into tragic pleasure only if this highly idiosyncratic interpre-
tation of that pleasure could be made plausible; in lieu of this, it is, for our purposes, moot.
Before turning to Schiller’s account, one assumption about tragic pleasure must be stated 
explicitly, namely that it exists. This has been doubted by at least one recent commentator, 
who has wondered if the experience may be devoid of pleasure of any kind and sought solely 
for something like its epistemic value.8 I shall not contest this at length here, but it is worth 
saying a few things to motivate my assumption to the contrary. The first is a prima facie jus-
tification, namely that it has been universally accepted as obvious by canonical commentators 
4 The tradition of this ‘Lucretian’ view takes its inspiration from De Rerum Natura, 2. 1–6.
5 For such a view, see e.g. John Stedman, Laelius and Hortensia (Edinburgh: Balfour, 1782), 151–155.
6 The ‘paradox of tragedy’ has been characterized this way by Aaron Ridley in his ‘Tragedy’, in Jerrold Levinson 
(ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 410; by Aaron Smuts in his ‘The Paradox of Painful 
Art’, The Journal of Aesthetic Education 41 (2007), 59–76, esp. 59, and seemingly by Jerrold Levinson in his 
introduction to Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Suffering Art Gladly: The Paradox of Negative Emotion in Art (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), x–xi.
7 Berys Gaut claims that ‘the paradox of tragedy’ is an instance of this more general problem, in his ‘The Paradox 
of Horror’, BJA 33 (1993), 344. This was also Hume’s question, although he ultimately denies that we actually 
do enjoy negative emotions per se. See his ‘Of Tragedy’ in his Selected Essays, ed. Stephen Copley (Oxford: OUP, 
2008).
8 Alex Neill, ‘Schopenhauer on Tragedy and Value’, in José Luis Bermúdez and Sebastian Gardner (eds), Art and 
Morality (Oxford: Routledge, 2003), 208; Aaron Ridley expresses qualified support in his ‘Tragedy’, 419.
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4 | SAMUEL HUGHES
from Plato onwards,9 and not merely by those whose hedonic theories of motivation entail 
that it is needed to account for our interest in the dramas—Kant, Schiller and Schopenhauer, 
for instance, held it too.10 It would be quite odd, to say the least, for so many thoughtful peo-
ple to have mistaken a completely un-pleasurable experience for an importantly pleasurable 
one. The second is a clutch of concessions. In particular, I should be clear that the existence 
of tragic pleasure does not entail that: (1) this pleasure is of a sensuous variety; (2) that our 
response does not also include a painful consciousness of the characters’ sufferings; (3) that 
this pleasure in tragedies is our only or principal motive in viewing them; or (4) that trag-
edies’ capacity to be the objects of pleasure is what is principally valuable about them. Schiller 
explicitly denied (1) and (2),11 and as will become clear, his view is also perfectly consistent 
with the rejection of (3) and (4). The intransigent denier of tragic pleasure may still not be 
convinced, but I hope the foregoing indicates at least that one need not to subscribe to some 
shallowly hedonistic view of tragedy to be interested in what follows.
II
We may now turn to consider Schiller’s interpretation of our pleasure.12 As noted above, 
Schiller understands our pleasure in tragedy as an experience of the sublime, which in turn 
he held to be an intense consciousness of our freedom. To fill out this claim, it is necessary to 
look at two areas of Schiller’s philosophy: his view of freedom, and his account of the sublime.
Schiller’s account of freedom is drawn substantially from Kant.13 Both held that free-
dom is manifested in the taking of an inclination or a moral precept as a reason for action:
9 For Plato, see the Republic, trans. George Maximilian Antony Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1992), 605 c–d.
10 See Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John Goldthwait (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1960), 52 and Critique of the Power of Judgement, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Section 52; Friedrich Schiller, ‘The Pleasure We Derive in Tragic 
Objects’, in his Aesthetical and Philosophical Essays, trans. Nicholas Dole (Boston: Francis A. Nichols & Co., 1902), 
II; Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. Eris Francis Jules Payne (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1969), I: 252–255 and esp. II: 433–437. For a survey of some of the innumerable further writers who 
have made the same assumption, see Earl Wasserman, ‘The Pleasures of Tragedy’, ELH 14 (1947), 283–307.
11 Regarding (1) see e.g. Friedrich Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, in Walter Hinderer and Daniel Dahlstrom (eds), Friedrich 
Schiller: Essays (New York: Continuum, 1993), 48–49; for (2) see e.g. ibid., 45–46 or ‘On the Sublime’, 44.
12 Schiller’s views are developed in a series of essays written over the 1790s. ‘On the Tragic Art’ and ‘The Pleasure We 
Derive From Tragic Objects’ date from around 1791; his view matures in ‘Of the Sublime’, ‘On Grace and Dignity’, 
‘On Dignity’, ‘On the Pathetic’ (all 1793) and ‘On the Sublime’ (probably between 1794 and 1796). These essays, 
except ‘Of the Sublime’, were translated rather loosely in Aesthetical and Philosophical Essays (2 vols), trans. Nicholas 
Dole (Boston: Francis A. Nichols & Co., 1902); Daniel Dahlstrom has more recently produced excellent scholarly 
translations of all except ‘The Pleasure We Derive From Tragic Objects’, ‘On Grace and Dignity’ and ‘On Dignity’, 
in Walter Hinderer and Daniel Dahlstrom (eds), Friedrich Schiller: Essays (New York: Continuum, 1993), which I use 
where possible. For the German originals, see Friedrich Schiller, Erzählungen und Theoretische Schriften, Vol. 5 of 
Friedrich Schiller: Sämtliche Werke, ed. Wolfgang Riedel (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004).
13 My reconstruction here especially involves some selection from Schiller’s writings, which actually seem to 
contain a number of views of freedom at different times. For a lucid discussion, see Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 
216–237. My choice is principally motivated by philosophical considerations, but also seems to have been the 
conception that Schiller settled on in his later essays; see esp. ‘On the Pathetic’, 59–69 and implicitly ‘On the 
Sublime’, 78. My characterization of Kant’s views is indebted to Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. 11–70.
AQ5
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Freedom of the will is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive can determine 
the will to an action only insofar as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim (he 
has made it into a general rule in accordance with which he will conduct himself)14
According to a favoured metaphor, this is the freedom of the will ‘as executive’—the 
capacity to choose which of a range of pre-existing ‘incentives’ to incorporate into its 
maxims as a reason for action. Hence if I decide to have a glass of water because I am 
thirsty, I  freely act on an inclination taken up as a reason for that action. This is pos-
sible only for a rational creature: indeed, it constitutes a basic instantiation of practi-
cal rationality. Kant contrasted this with the choices of an animal, which, he supposed, 
would simply be determined by its thirst to seek water, without the mediation of an active 
choice. The same may be true for infants, the insane and perhaps sane adults under certain 
conditions: in such cases their acts, in lacking rationality, also lack this form of freedom.15 
For reasons that we must pass over here, Kant supposed that such free choices of a rational 
adult cannot be understood in terms of the causal laws of the phenomenal world, and must 
be regarded as manifestations of the agent’s transcendental freedom.
It is very important to distinguish this freedom as executive from Kant’s famous pro-
posal that the will is also free ‘as legislator’—that is, that it possesses the capacity to actu-
ally generate an incentive for itself, namely the moral law. Although one does not manifest 
one’s freedom as legislator in acting from an amoral incentive, one still manifests one’s 
freedom as executive. Schiller himself did not appreciate this point in his earlier writings 
on tragedy, which temporarily led him to the implausible conclusion that tragic heroes 
acting from motives other than the moral law are unfree and therefore aesthetically defec-
tive; in his mature work, however, it is freedom as executive that he places at the centre 
of his understanding of tragedy.
Schiller’s view of the sublime was also indebted to Kant’s philosophy, specifically to the 
idea of the ‘dynamical sublime’ that Kant develops in the third Critique.16 This idea shares 
with other 18th century conceptions of the sublime the notion that there is something ter-
rible about sublime objects and painful in our response to them; it adds to this, however, 
that what we really take pleasure in is an awareness of our own super-sensible freedom, 
which stands above all such natural terrors. We enjoy imaginatively entertaining the idea 
of something against which we are helpless qua animal, on this view, only because this 
thought indirectly highlights the ‘capacity for resistance of quite another kind’ within 
us, that is, the freedom untouchable by any natural power.17 Schiller departs from Kant, 
however, in claiming that the most sublime objects of all are not merely those that prompt 
such awareness via this indirect route, but those in which the overcoming of suffering 
14 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore Greene and Hoyt Hudson (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1960), 19.
15 For Kant on animals, see e.g. his The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 213–214; on the insane, see his Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett, 1963), 52; for infants, ibid. 57; for people in a state of intoxication, ibid. 62. Schiller remarks that 
certain behaviours are not under the governance of one’s freedom at ‘On the Pathetic’, 51–52.
16 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, Sections 23–29, esp. Sections 28–29.
17 Ibid., Section 28.
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6 | SAMUEL HUGHES
by freedom is actually apparent to the observer in the object. The paradigm of a sublime 
object accordingly shifts dramatically, from Alpine storms or volcanic eruptions to indi-
viduals enduring through suffering. In one essay, Schiller explicitly distinguishes this as 
the ‘pathetically sublime’ (Pathetischerhabene):
Two main conditions must be met for the pathetically sublime: first, a vivid image of 
suffering, in order to awaken the emotion of compassion with the proper strength, and 
second, an image of the resistance to the suffering, in order to call into consciousness 
the mind’s inner freedom. Only by virtue of the first does the object become pathetic, 
only by virtue of the second condition does the pathetic become at the same time 
something sublime.18
Our response to the sublime is thus a ‘mixed feeling’: we feel pain on account of our sym-
pathy for suffering, but also ‘gladness’ (Frohsein), rising even to ‘rapture’ (Entzücken), in 
the consciousness of our freedom occasioned by witnessing resistance to that suffering.19 
Suffering is thus not an object of pleasure per se, but only an instrument to this conscious-
ness, which is what is actually pleasurable.20 Schiller’s key claim for our purposes is of 
course that tragedy is sublime in this sense:
From this basic principle flow the two fundamental laws of all tragic art. These are 
first: portrayal of the suffering nature; second, portrayal of moral independence in the 
suffering.21
There is an important point to be clarified before proceeding. Strictly, according to Kant, 
all actions of rational creatures manifest freedom to the same extent: there is no obvious 
sense in which the choice to continue acting from one’s principles in adversity is freer 
than the choice to betray them. It might be thought that this precludes Schiller’s claim 
that certain responses to suffering are distinctively sublime, and perhaps even entails that 
any action of a rational person is as sublime as any other. But this would be to mistake 
Schiller’s view. Schiller does not hold that sublime actions are those in which freedom is 
most manifested, but rather those with a distinctive capacity to prompt a consciousness 
of freedom in the observer.22 And this varies from action to action a great deal. To under-
stand this point, consider Christine Korsgaard’s description of a person who, despite pos-
sessing Kantian freedom, uses that freedom simply to follow his or her strongest desire 
at any given time, thereby behaving exactly as if he or she did not possess this freedom at 
all.23 Although such a person manifests freedom as much as an ascetic who never acts on 
18 Schiller, ‘Of the Sublime’, 44. This essay contains Schiller’s official taxonomy of the sublime; in others, he tends 
to use ‘sublime’ to refer to the pathetic sublime only. I shall do likewise hereafter. For its possessing greater 
intensity than other forms of the sublime, see ibid. 23–26 and 36–38. Note that ‘pathetisch’ is really closer to 
‘emotive’ than to the English term ‘pathetic’.
19 Schiller, ‘Concerning the Sublime’, 74.
20 See e.g. Schiller, ‘The Art of Tragedy’, 18–19, ‘On the Pathetic’, 49–50.
21 Schiller, ‘On the Sublime’, 44.
22 See esp. Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 51–55.
23 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 99.
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desires at all, it is clear enough that someone observing him or her would not be vividly 
impressed by this fact, because his or her actions were in no way outwardly different from 
the behaviours that he or she would have exhibited without freedom. Hence, Schiller sug-
gests, following the moral law where it diverges from desire is a distinctively vivid revela-
tion of freedom, not because of its moral rightness per se, but because of its independence 
from inclination: no animal would behave thus.24 Relatedly, some kinds of distinctively 
rational immorality may be sublime.25 One clear case of this would be a long-term proj-
ect, requiring a conception of a future object of desire and the endurance of much present 
hardship in its attainment.26 In spite of being motivated in the last analysis by inclination, 
such behaviour nonetheless reveals executive freedom and possesses a bleaker sublimity 
of its own.
III
What sort of considerations can usefully be appealed to in determining how plausible 
Schiller’s account is? A number of intuitive attractions are immediately apparent. Sandra 
Shapshay has plausibly claimed that an account of our response to tragedy should cap-
ture the mixture of painfulness and pleasurableness involved, and also some sense of its 
being at once humbling and elevating for the viewer.27 Schiller’s theory clearly succeeds 
handsomely on these two scores: it ties the pleasure of the sublime to pain at the other’s 
suffering, and revealing our transcendental freedom through our physical vulnerability. 
Relatedly, it is prima facie plausible as an explanation of the widespread sense that we 
learn something ethically significant from tragedy,28 in that on Schiller’s view just what 
is pleasurable is an awareness of our transcendent nature: he goes so far as to claim that 
without the sublime, ‘we would lose sight of our permanent vocation and our true father-
land’.29 But these sorts of considerations do not, I suspect, get us very far, because they 
could also be claimed for many other possible pleasures. In any case, I shall not focus upon 
them here.
The considerations that I think distinguish Schiller’s theory are, rather, facts about the 
object of the pleasure, that is, about tragedies. Observations about the object of a plea-
sure can help us to determine the plausibility of a given characterization of that pleasure 
in a number of ways. Sometimes, they provide outright counter-examples: as remarked 
above, the claim that our pleasure in all tragedies is a pleasure in portrayals of morally 
24 See e.g. Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 62–63.
25 Ibid., 63–69.
26 On understanding Kantian maxims as long-term projects like this, see Onora O’Neill, ‘Kant after Virtue’, 
Enquiry 26 (1983), 387–405. See esp. Kant, ‘On Self-Mastery’, in his Lectures on Ethics.
27 Sandra Shapshay, ‘The Problem with the Problem with Tragedy: Schopenhauer’s Solution Revisited’, BJA 52 
(2012), 17–32. Shapshay correctly attributes these advantages to Schopenhauer’s theory: I shall return to the 
relationship between Schiller’s and Schopenhauer’s views in Section 4.
28 See again Shapshay, ‘The Problem with the Problem of Tragedy’, esp. 29–31, Neill, ‘Schopenhauer on Tragedy 
and Value’ and Ridley, ‘Tragedy’.
29 Schiller, ‘Concerning the Sublime’, 84.
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noble heroes is falsified if some tragedies do not portray morally noble heroes. More sub-
tly, however, they can pick out features of the object and show how they make it a proper 
object of this kind of pleasure. If they can show sufficiently convincingly that this object 
is just the sort of thing we take this kind of pleasure in, they make it extremely plausible 
that this is indeed what we are doing. Such observations are especially persuasive if they 
identify characteristics that had already been considered pleasurable in rival accounts; if a 
plausible counter-interpretation can be offered of why these characteristics seem pleasur-
able, the explanatory power of the theory is all the greater. In this section I shall argue 
that considerations of this kind apply in the case of Schiller’s theory, strongly enough to 
make it very plausible. In particular, I  shall suggest that many of the pre-theoretically 
important characteristics of tragedy render tragedy sublime in Schiller’s sense—that is, 
that they may constitute ways in which transcendent freedom is revealed. I begin with the 
most obvious example—courage—and then pass on to consider three characteristics of 
tragedy that have been thought by other commentators to be what makes it pleasurable: 
comings-to-knowledge, collisions of values and the hero’s hamartia. Most of my discus-
sion reconstructs interpretations that Schiller makes in his essays, but of course only a 
selection may be made from such a rich source; in places, too, I shall go beyond Schiller, 
in order to draw out respects in which his theory can accommodate insights that other 
philosophers have had about the object of tragic pleasure.
Schiller’s theory applies most straightforwardly, then, to the courage of the tragic hero. 
Walter Kaufmann noted that courage is the only characteristic that all tragic heroes share, 
be they noble or wicked, innocent or wise.30 It plays an important role as a condition for 
our pleasure in tragedy in a number of canonical accounts.31 And indeed, the idea of a 
tragic hero terrified, broken and abased really is, I submit, an extremely strange one: if 
Antigone were to plead for her life and scream with animal fear as she was taken away to 
die, how different would be our response to the play! Schiller’s claim must of course be 
that the significance of courage for our response is that courage constitutes a revelation 
of freedom. In fact, he discusses two ways in which what we would call courage may be 
understood this way, both, to my mind, very plausible. The first is what we might call 
‘having strong nerves’—the ability to continue operating as a rational agent rather than to 
be driven, so to speak, wild with fear. Schiller calls this ‘sublime composure’ or ‘dignity’; 
he supposes it to be the most important form of sublimity in the plastic arts and still very 
significant in poetry, as in the response of Milton’s Lucifer to Hell.32 The second would be 
choosing to continue to pursue one’s distinctively rational ends, despite one’s fear of the 
costs to one—be those ends moral or prudential, as per the discussion in Section 2.33 
Schiller terms this ‘sublimity of action’, and holds it to be the central form of the sublime 
in tragedy, evinced by heroes throughout the canon.
30 Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, 145.
31 E.g. Hegel, Lectures, II: 1197–1198, 1209–1210; Friedrich Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Douglas Stott 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 89, 256; Arthur Miller, ‘Tragedy and the Common Man’, in 
Robert Martin and Stephen Centola (eds), The Theatre Essays of Arthur Miller (New York: Viking Penguin, 1978 [1949]), 4.
32 Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 59–60 and also ‘On Grace and Dignity’ and ‘On Dignity’.
33 Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 60–61 and ‘Concerning the Sublime’.
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Schiller may offer plausible interpretations of many of the other properties of trag-
edy that commentators have held to be important to us, however. Consider first the 
significance in tragedy of a movement of the hero towards a veridical understanding of 
his situation: for instance, Oedipus learning of his origins, Heracles of the crimes of 
his madness, Lear of his culpability. Again, this movement towards understanding has 
often been thought to be an important element of what it is about tragedy that gives plea-
sure.34 Schiller seems to me capable of accounting for the significance of such comings-to-
knowledge in several ways. On the simplest level, the discovery is often an occasion for 
fortitude. When Oedipus, Ajax or Othello learns of the horrible actions he has uncom-
prehendingly perpetrated, the strength and integrity with which he responds to news 
that many would refuse to accept or disintegrate before is clearly apt to appear sublime in 
Schiller’s sense.35 Such discoveries clearly bring suffering of peculiar depth and intensity; 
nor do they obscure the hero’s self-expression in the way that some physical torments 
do. A second point worth making in this connection is that ignorance of the reality of 
the situation around him is likely to cause the hero to act in self-defeating and futile ways 
(e.g. Oedipus’ inadvertently cursing himself). Although of course the hero is not strictly 
less free in such a case, the spectator’s imaginative sense of his liberty is hardly likely to 
be augmented by the fact that its exercise so frequently has unintended and disastrous 
effects—and, as per the discussion in Section 2, the viewer’s imaginative sense is what 
matters. The coming-to-knowledge finally allows the hero to exercise his freedom effec-
tively, and thereby gives the audience a much clearer apprehension of that freedom than 
whilst its use was ironically thwarted.
Schiller also offers, however, a much deeper interpretation of comings-to-knowl-
edge.36 This rests on the fact that most such discoveries in tragedy have a strongly ethical 
dimension: they involve the clarification of the hero’s moral relation to his environment. 
Consider for instance the discoveries of Oedipus, Heracles, Ajax and Othello. In fact, 
in many cases the ‘discovery’ is purely ethical—it is an acceptance of culpability or of 
hitherto-denied obligations. We may number Lear, Don Carlos, Coriolanus and Titus 
and Bérénice in this class. In these cases the hero accepts terrible burdens as the corollary 
of acknowledging the moral realities of his situation—sometimes of actual sacrifice, as 
with Titus and Bérénice or Don Carlos, but more fundamentally of guilt and penitence. 
Such cases are thus an especially acute instance of Schiller’s sublimity: the free person not 
merely endures through suffering, but brings it upon himself as the cost of his integrity, 
that is, his acceptance of the difficult truths that his reason lays down for him.
Consider next Hegel’s celebrated claim that tragedy contains a collision of opposed 
moral or spiritual principles.37 Hegel’s most famous illustration is of course Antigone, with 
Antigone taken to represent loyalty to the family and Creon loyalty to the state, but Hegel 
34 E.g. Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, trans. Stephen Halliwell (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1987), Sections 11 and 16; Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, I: 253 and esp. II: 435–436.
35 Schiller himself had portrayed such revelations in Die Räuber and Fiesco.
36 I follow and expand slightly upon Schiller’s discussions at ‘On the Pathetic’, 60–61 and ‘On the Pleasure We 
Derive from Tragic Objects’, 95–96.
37 Hegel, Lectures, II: 1192–1237.
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also offered remarkable interpretations of many other tragedies as involving such spiri-
tual oppositions, including Seven Against Thebes, Iphigenia in Aulis and Electra, as well as, in 
modified forms, Oedipus Tyrannus, Hamlet and Goethe’s Faust. We shall look at how Hegel 
understood the significance of these oppositions to us in Section 4; for the time being it 
need only be remarked that though many commentators doubt that Hegel’s account really 
applies to all canonical tragedies, it has been very widely held that it highlights something 
profoundly important in many works.38
Again, Schiller has the resources to explain the importance of this feature to our 
response. Devotion to, and sacrifice for, some principle greater than oneself is for Schiller 
one of the most vivid expressions of freedom possible. Hence, on the simplest level, the 
opposition of characters loyal to opposed principles creates a natural setting for the exhi-
bition of that freedom in adversity: the very ardour with which one pursues his ideal 
creates circumstances for the other to do the same. Antigone would exercise a great deal 
less courage and zeal if Creon caved in easily and vice versa. In some tragedies, however, 
the opposing principles are contained within a given character rather than personified 
in opposing ones.39 Here I think the Schillerian explanation will be similar to that in the 
case of coming-to-knowledge. A character who acknowledges a value that he must over-
ride in order to honour some value he takes to be higher incurs upon himself a burden 
of sorrow and agent regret. That one accepts such pain as the cost of one’s continuing 
commitment to something that one must betray reveals how serious that commitment 
is. More than this, it also reveals the strength of one’s loyalty to that upon which one did 
act. Were Brutus to betray Caesar single-mindedly and without moral anxiety we should 
not, of course, have any sense of his love and loyalty to Caesar, but we should also have a 
diminished sense of how serious is his dedication to the Republic, for we would not know 
how dearly he holds the values that he is prepared to override for its sake.
Similar considerations may be adduced to explain the significance of the hero’s hamar-
tia. Aristotle’s suggestion that the hero of tragedy play a role in his own downfall in virtue 
of a hamartia, variously translated as ‘flaw’, ‘error of judgement’ or ‘mistake’ is perhaps 
the most famous of all claims about the characteristics of tragedy.40 We may pass over the 
question of which rendering is to be preferred, as well as whether Aristotle’s claim does 
indeed apply to all tragedies: I suggest only that Schiller may offer interpretations of why 
the hero’s having some active part in his downfall may play a role in making tragedy plea-
surable. Firstly, Schiller might claim that although it is not impossible for a passive tragic 
hero to express his freedom in solely fortitude or defiance, it is generally less easy to appre-
hend the dignity of a character that has no part at all in shaping his own destiny, compared 
38 For discussions influenced by this idea, see e.g. Kaufman, Tragedy and Philosophy, 234–248; Nicolas Berdyaev, 
The Destiny of Man, trans. Natalie Duddington (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948), 31 ff.; Karl Jaspers, Tragedy Is Not 
Enough, trans. Harald Reiche, Harry Moore and Karl Deutsch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 57 ff.
39 Hegel notes this at Lectures, II: 1218–1219, 1229–1232; it is richly discussed by Anthony Cecil Bradley in his 
Shakespearean Tragedy (London: Macmillan and Co., 1916 [1904]), esp. 16–19.
40 Aristotle, Poetics, Section 13. For two examples of the many creative developments of this idea, see Henry Home, 
Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism, ed. Peter Jones (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), II: 649–655 and 
Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy, esp. 11–16.
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with that of a Coriolanus or an Antigone.41 Such a character may tend to seem insipid 
or inert, on account of one of the most vivid ways of expressing freedom—causally-
efficacious action—being precluded. Another way in which Schiller might accommodate 
the strengths of the Aristotelian account is by appeal to the claim noted above that guilt 
or agent regret are amongst the most vivid ways of revealing a rational nature. Since one 
must usually actively transgress in order to occasion these conditions, this important form 
of the sublime is only available to tragic heroes who are active in shaping their situation.42 
This could be contrasted with the relative passivity of the heroes of melodramas, which 
Schiller might suggest is related to their being pathetically innocent.43
It is worth finishing this section by noting some more mundane points about the pre-
sentation of the hero in tragedy that are very much in keeping with the spirit of Schiller’s 
account.44 In particular, the portrayal of heroes tends to de-emphasize their natures as 
animals and as functionaries in social systems. Tragic heroes are almost never shown eat-
ing or sleeping onstage, they virtually never perform quotidian tasks (washing, dressing, 
etc.) and they are rarely seen in a state of physical exertion. Schiller notes that in success-
ful tragedies, a strong sense is always conveyed of the heroes as individuals irreducible to 
their social roles: though they are often rulers, we never think of them as ‘the King’ or 
‘the General’, but always as Lear or Coriolanus.45 The sense in which I think that all this 
coheres with Schiller’s account is that inasmuch as the viewer’s imaginative sense of the 
tragic hero is of a creature of physical needs and appetites, or one reducible to a social 
role, it precludes apprehending his freedom as a rational person.46 By de-emphasizing such 
things in their portrayal of the hero, tragedians focus our attention on his personality—he 
is shown to us as a creature which has only serious thoughts and occupations. Though 
not strictly a form of the sublime in Schiller’s sense, since no overcoming of suffering is 
involved, these kinds of characteristics will result in an unmixed and therefore also more 
muted form of the same kind of pleasure—the apprehension of freedom. We find this also 
in the speech of tragic heroes: virtually without exception they are highly articulate, use a 
fairly formal register, and of course speak in verse.47 This is of course significant in many 
ways, but for our purposes it may suffice to say that it precludes the errors, obscurities 
41 This is hinted at in Schiller’s discussion of the distinction between sublime composure and sublime action; see 
‘On the Pathetic’, 59–61. Other commentators have understood the significance of hamartia in ways closely 
related to this: see Hegel, Lectures, II: 1214–1215 and Miller, ‘Tragedy and the Common Man’.
42 ‘On the Pleasure’, 95–96, 98.
43 For another account of how freedom could be manifested especially by a hero with a hamartia, see Schelling, 
Philosophy of Art, 251–255.
44 Schiller’s discussion of dignity (in the sense of dignity of comportment) in ‘On Dignity’ and ‘On Grace and 
Dignity’ is of special relevance here.
45 Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 46–47. We might also observe in this connection that tragedies are usually named for 
their heroes, unlike, say, comedies or social realist dramas.
46 Readers might adduce Phèdre as a conspicuous counter-example. To be sure, she is strongly afflicted with a 
passion of the flesh. Yet surely there are few more vivid exhibitions of rational personality in literature than the 
guilt and self-disgust with which she responds to this desire!
47 The ‘elevating’ effect of verse on our perception of the tragic hero was attributed great significance by George 
Steiner; see his The Death of Tragedy (Oxford: OUP, 1980 [1961]).
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and tics which ordinarily inhibit speakers from expressing themselves: the language of the 
tragic hero tends to be more completely at their command than that of speakers either in 
other genres, or in reality, and their rational personality more transparently revealed in 
it. Once again, then, this coheres closely with Schiller’s theory: their portrayal reveals 
their moral personality un-obscured by exiguous frailties. There are occasional apparent 
exceptions to this—Lear and Philoctetes, for instance—but it is significant that their 
degradation is always temporary and succeeded by a dignity of portrayal that is the more 
vivid for what has preceded it.
If the above observations and interpretations are accurate, it is clear that Schiller’s 
theory is at least plausible. In particular, it looks to perform well against the interpreta-
tive desiderata discussed above. First, it is at least plausible that it has no outright coun-
ter-examples. The object of Schiller’s pleasure—the revelation of human freedom—is 
multiply instantiable, and accordingly only some of the above characteristics need to be 
present in any given tragedy in order for it to be the proper object of the pleasure Schiller 
describes. Thus, although it is certainly true that many successful tragedies do not have 
all of the characteristics discussed above, this is far from sufficient to constitute a coun-
ter-example to Schiller’s thesis. I cannot myself find any tragedy that constitutes a clear 
counter-example, by lacking enough of these qualities, in sufficient measure, for it to 
be implausible that we take Schiller’s pleasure in it. But of course this cannot be shown 
exhaustively here, and I must invite readers to consider it for themselves.
My hope, however, is that the observations in this section do not merely fail to falsify Schiller’s 
account, but that they suggest it is quite attractive. Many of the most prominent and oft-remarked 
characteristics of tragedy are plausibly just such as to make it the proper object of the pleasure 
Schiller suggests. Furthermore, as noted, these are often the very characteristics in virtue of 
which commentators have thought tragedy to be pleasurable: Schiller’s theory can offer a unified 
account of why all these commentators were right, though not for the reasons they supposed.
IV
If the considerations advanced in the preceding section are correct, then Schiller’s is at 
least a plausible interpretation of our pleasure in tragedy. Notoriously, however, it has a 
great many competitors, many of which have furthermore been often found to be plau-
sible in their own right. The question arises, accordingly, of whether the attractiveness 
of Schiller’s account really distinguishes it very much, or whether a similarly sympathetic 
reconstruction could make any serious theory of tragedy sound plausible in the same way. 
I cannot, of course, discuss every account of tragic pleasure ever offered here. Instead, 
I will compare Schiller’s account with two of its much more famous successors in the post-
Kantian tradition, namely the theories of Schopenhauer and Hegel. These two theories, 
I will argue, each have an important limitation in comparison with Schiller’s view.
Consider firstly Schopenhauer.48 Schopenhauer claims that the vision of the empiri-
cal world that we see in tragedies so horrifies us that we are impelled to renounce our 
48 Schopenhauer’s discussion may be found in The World as Will and Representation, I: 252–255 and esp. II: 433–437. 
My presentation is indebted to Shapshay, ‘The Problem with the Problem of Tragedy’.
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entanglement in it. In this renunciation, we become aware of something within us that 
transcends this suffering reality, and it is this awareness that is pleasurable:
In the tragedy the terrible side of life is presented to us, the wailing and lamentation 
of mankind, the dominion of chance and error, the fall of the righteous, the triumph 
of the wicked; and so that aspect of life is brought before our eyes which directly 
opposes our will. At this sight we feel ourselves urged to turn our will away from 
life, to give up willing and loving life. But precisely in this way we become aware that 
there is still left in us something different that we cannot possibly know positively, 
but only negatively, as that which does not will life ... . What gives to everything 
tragic ... the characteristic tendency to the sublime, is the dawning of the knowledge 
that the world can afford us no true satisfaction, and are therefore not worth our 
attachment to them.49
It will be readily apparent that Schopenhauer’s account shares a number of attractive fea-
tures with Schiller’s. It too characterizes our response as ambivalent: there is something 
painful and shocking in the experience of tragedy, but also something pleasurable and 
consoling.50 More than this, the two accounts of these pains and pleasures are similar: in 
both cases, an initial horror at empirical suffering leads to a pleasurable consciousness of 
that in us which transcends the world of experience, something that cannot be perceived 
directly but only as an implication of the distinctive way in which a rational creature 
responds to empirical suffering.
The most significant difference between Schiller and Schopenhauer, for our purposes, 
is that Schopenhauer sees the mere presentation of the horrors of the empirical world as 
sufficient for tragic pleasure. Although our pleasure is constituted by an awareness of human 
transcendence to suffering, the human in question is the viewer and all that the tragic hero 
need do to afford the viewer this recognition is to suffer.51 By contrast, Schiller, as we 
have seen, takes it to be a necessary condition for our pleasure in tragedy that we also see 
the hero’s resistance to suffering: the portrayal of mere suffering, as noted above, is merely 
distressing for the viewer. It seems to me that Schiller’s view is much the more attractive 
here. To see why, consider the alternative version of Antigone mentioned in Section 3, in 
which Antigone is led away broken, pleading and screaming with animal fear. Such a play 
would, I take it, present the horror of suffering, the ‘fall of the righteous’ and the ‘wailings 
and lamentations of mankind’ no less vividly than the actual tragedy—more so, perhaps—
yet I submit that a large part of our pleasure in Antigone would be thereby destroyed, to be 
replaced with horror and disorientation. This suggests, I think, that by locating the tran-
scendence of suffering, so to speak, in the viewer rather than in the work, Schopenhauer 
has misconstrued as unnecessary to our pleasure much of what really matters in tragedy 
and underspecified what an object must be like in order to render us tragic pleasure.
Now this is not quite fair to Schopenhauer, for he goes on to claim that the best trag-
edies are those in which the tragic hero not only occasions the renunciation of the world 
49 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, II: 433–434.
50 Shapshay, ‘The Problem with the Problem of Tragedy’, 19.
51 In this way, Schopenhauer’s sublime is closer to Kant’s than Schiller’s, as per the discussion in Section 2 above.
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in the viewer, but actually does so himself at the conclusion of the work. This is rather 
uncommon in the tragic canon—indeed, Schopenhauer apparently held that none of the 
tragedies of antiquity include it fully—but it is found in certain modern works, notably 
Die Jungfrau von Orleans, Norma, the Gretchen episode of Faust, Die Braut von Messina and 
Hamlet.52 This addition to Schopenhauer’s account does not, however, help much with 
our difficulty. The alternative version of Antigone remains at least as pleasurable as the 
actual one, since in neither does Antigone renounce the world in Schopenhauer’s sense, 
even if it is surpassed by Schopenhauer’s rather eccentric list of favourites.53 And because 
only a minority of tragedies portray transcendence as Schopenhauer understands it, 
Schopenhauer could not rule out the pleasurableness of the alternative Antigone by claim-
ing that we only take tragic pleasure in works which actually portray this transcendence, 
because of course this would also imply that we do not take this pleasure in most tragedies.
This is not to imply that the pleasure Schopenhauer describes has never existed, nor 
even that it has never been occasioned by a tragedy. It seems to me plausible enough that 
certain people have, on certain occasions, been prompted to this profound world-renun-
ciation by tragedies and that they would be prompted to the same thing by the alternative 
Antigone. Perhaps Schopenhauer himself was one such. But this is something quite dif-
ferent, and requiring the subject to be in a vastly more unusual condition, to the normal 
kind of pleasure that one takes when one seriously contemplates a tragic drama. What is 
implausible is that the normal pleasure that one takes in a reading of Antigone would not 
be seriously marred in the alternative version; it is not implausible that both works could 
occasionally prompt a second, highly unusual pleasure in certain people already on the 
brink of this total disillusionment. So Schopenhauer’s account could indeed describe a 
pleasure in tragedy, but only quite a marginal and special one. For our ordinary aesthetic 
experiences, Schiller’s account is far more promising.
Matters stand quite differently with Hegel’s account.54 Hegel takes as his starting point 
the observation discussed in Section 3 above, namely that tragedies frequently involve the 
opposition of two spiritual principles, colliding in the action of the drama. In the para-
digm case, each principal is championed by a hero who adheres to his or her respective 
principle absolutely and one-sidedly. At the climax of the tragedy, these representatives 
perish, but in their perishing the audience is enabled to see what they do not, namely the 
way in which the truth is shared between their principles. It is this apprehension in the 
spectator that constitutes our pleasure in tragedy:
In tragedy the eternal substance of things emerges victorious in a reconciling way, 
because it strips away from conflicting individuals only their false one-sidedness, 
while the positive elements in what they willed it displays as what is to be retained, 
without discord but affirmatively harmonized.55
52 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, I: 253–254, II: 434–436.
53 On this eccentricity, see Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, 167–168.
54 Hegel’s main treatment of tragedy is to be found at Lectures, II: 1192–1238. I present Hegel’s account without its 
original metaphysical garb, interested as I am in seeing how plausible Hegel’s theory of tragedy is intrinsically 
independent of the support lent to it by Hegel’s wider system.
55 Hegel, Lectures, II: 1199.
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Now, in order for a character to be the adequate representative of some great spiritual 
principle, he or she must clearly have great depth of conviction, and the ability to with-
stand fear and transitory temptations. Nor should the expression of a character’s deep 
conviction be obscured by inarticulacy or physical weakness.56 Hence Hegel’s shares 
much of Schiller’s attractive picture of the tragic hero, and his tragic pleasure is, like 
Schiller’s, a kind of awareness of a higher spiritual reality glimpsed through the charac-
ters’ travails.
The difficulty with Hegel’s account is in a sense the opposite of that with Schopenhauer’s: 
it is that the opposition of two partially valid principles, the characteristic of tragedy in 
virtue of which Hegel holds that we take pleasure in it, simply does not seem to be pres-
ent in quite a large number of canonical tragedies. This point has been made many times 
by others and need only be briefly rehearsed here.57 Almost no tragedies conform per-
fectly to Hegel’s schema, with two main characters representing equally valid views and 
both being ruined at the conclusion—Richard II and Antony and Cleopatra suggest them-
selves, but then Bolingbroke and Octavius survive apparently triumphant, rather than 
ruined like Creon. The account may be extended, weakening the requirement that the 
protagonists must perish and that the principles be equally valid and including cases in 
which the conflict takes place within the characters: this certainly makes the theory’s 
reach somewhat wider.58 But even so, there remain many tragic heroes who seem to stand 
against no opposing principle at all, but only baseness and violence (the Trojan women, 
Iphigenia, Heracles, the Duchess of Malfi, Britannicus); in other tragedies it is not clear 
whether anyone at all represents a spiritual principle (what are we to make of Marlowe’s 
wicked heroes, for instance, of Macbeth or of Schiller’s Wallenstein?). It appears, there-
fore, that the pleasure that we manifestly take in such works cannot be that which Hegel 
is describing.
Once again, this does not imply that Hegel’s pleasure does not exist at all, but only that 
it seems to play a more marginal role in our response to tragedy than that which Schiller 
describes. Although my own sense is that much of the pleasure we take in Hegel’s spiri-
tual collisions is actually a pleasure in the moral depth of the heroes revealed thereby (as 
discussed in Section 3), it may also include a pleasurable sense of intellectual resolution. 
Schiller’s pleasure, however, is surely much more central.
56 See for instance ibid., 1198, 1207; Hegel, Lectures, I: 236–244.
57 This is claimed both by writers unsympathetic to Hegel, e.g. Frank Lawrence Lucas, Tragedy (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1928), 40–43, and by many who, like myself, believe that there is much of interest and value in Hegel’s 
discussion, e.g. Anthony Cecile Bradley, ‘Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy’ in his Oxford Lectures on Poetry (New York: 
Macmillan, 1965 [1909]), esp. 85–92; Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, esp. 135–138, Kaufmann, Tragedy and 
Philosophy, 234–248 and 326–336 and Gardner, ‘Tragedy, Morality and Metaphysics’, 241–243. Kaufmann 
suggests that we should not see Hegel as offering a general theory of tragedy at all, but rather a series of rich 
interpretations of particular groups of tragedies. There is much to be said for this, but it only reinforces the claim 
that we find in Schiller a more general account of our response to tragedy than we do in Hegel.
58 See Hegel’s discussion of modern ‘romantic’ tragedy at Lectures, II: 1206–1208 and of dramas in which the 
reconciliation occurs in the drama rather than solely in the audience at ibid. 1203–1205 and 1219–1220; 
Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, 326–328.
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* * * * *
My suggestion, then, is that the neglect in which Schiller’s account has languished is unjus-
tified and that it constitutes a powerful and attractive characterization of our response to 
tragedy. Much of what is taken to be important about tragedies, either pre-theoretically or 
on other canonical theories, can be understood as making them apt for the pleasure that 
Schiller describes. There are also good reasons to suppose that some of the better-known 
Idealist theories of tragedy could not play so central a role in explaining our response to 
tragedy as Schiller’s can. My own view is that this is also true of many of the other canoni-
cal theories of tragedy, but this cannot be shown here.
One further consideration should be mentioned before concluding. This is that 
Schiller’s theory is not necessarily available in isolation from other commitments: in par-
ticular, it seems to presuppose some kind of Kantian distinction between rational and 
sensible nature and a Kantian account of free will. Even if it is possible to disentangle 
these distinctions from the transcendental idealism in which they were originally embed-
ded, they would clearly remain substantive and contentious philosophical claims. If they 
are rejected, then Schiller’s intrinsically plausible account of tragedy is imperilled. This 
opens up some very intriguing questions about the contribution that art may make to 
philosophy: if we needed a Kantian view of philosophical anthropology and free will to 
understand our experience of tragedy—an experience that many have taken to be pro-
foundly significant—would this constitute a mark in their favour vis-à-vis their rivals? But 
such matters are beyond the scope of the present enquiry and must be left for the future.59
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